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THE PROFILE OF A NEW MEXICO PROGRESSIVE

ROBBRT W. LARSON

IN

of New Mexico, Professor Warren Beck wrote
that the state "may be in the United States but is not of the United
States."! He employed this familiar but appropriate expression to
underscore a belief widely held by students of New Mexico's rich
,history that the political development of this state is unlike that of
any other. Its unparalleled nature is primarily the result of a large
Hispano population, which even now comprises about twenty-eight
per cent of the tota1,2 The cultural composition of New Mexico's
people is not only highly relevant to the state's history in general,
but also will have a bearing on this analysis of New Mexico's progressive leaders in an attempt to ascertain whether their prime
motivations were ideological, political, or generational.
The lively politics of theProgressive Movement in New Mexico
were played out against a most interesting background. The combination of an imposing Hispano majority and the complications
of territorial government, when added to the environment existing
in a frontier society, provide compelling reasons why New Mexico
was so slow in its achievement of basic progressive reforms.
The Spanish-speaking people of the Territory were faced from
the very beginning with new and confusing institutions imported
into New Mexico and imposed upon them by their American conquerors. Handicapped by a lack of language skills in English and
unfamiliar with the new Anglo ways, New Mexico's native ele- .
ment was extremely vulnerable to economic and political exploitation by shrewd and ambitious newcomers. The acquisition of immense Spanish and Mexican land grants by clever Anglo attorneys,
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during the late nineteenth century, ultimately led to the creation
of the militant Alianza and to the now famous courthouse raid at
Tierra Amarilla by Reies Lopez Tijerina, in 1967, in the "other
June War."
The loyalty of most of these Hispanos was won by the Republican party in the post-Civil War years, resulting in a domination
of New Mexico politics by a determined Old Guard leadership.
Kenneth N. Owens, in a fascinating study of Western territorial
politics, has called New Mexico's political structure a "no-party"
system, in which party government was managed by a "coalition of
local interests that cut across party lines."3 The power of these local
interest groups culminated in the remarkably potent Santa Fe Ring,
in which leaders of both the Republican and Democratic organizations worked together at systematically gobbling up countless acres
of land originally granted to influential Hispanos. But, within the
Ring itself, powerful Republicans, such as the always durable
Thomas B. Catron, had the dominant influence. Because they had
access to federal patronage during most of the late nineteenth century, Republicans of Catron's ilk, more frequently than Democrats,
were able to distribute the political prizes so eagerly sought by
native leaders for themselves and their families. Even today, the
Hispano's enjoyment of local politics makes a school board election
the occasion for a titanic struggle. The deeply entrenched Republican party continued to orchestrate politics in New Mexico by
taking full advantage of the patronage system inherent in the
territorial form of government.
A frontier environment prevailed in New Mexico well into the
twentieth century. George Curry once said of another prominent
leader, the genteel, Cornell-educated Herbert J. Hagerman, that
he was "wholly without experience in practical politics, especially
the rough-and-ready, and no-holds-barred kind prevalent in the
New Mexico of the period."4 During the 1 9 1 0 constitutional convention the colorful anti-progressive, Albert Bacon Fall, carried a
gun, which in view of his quick temper so worried his wife and
daughter that they sat every other day in the House Chamber in
Santa Fe, where the state constitution was being written, in order
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to keep an eye on him. 5 Corruption was rampant enough to be a
ready-made issue for progressive politicians.
The territorial status of New Mexico during the early years of
the Progressive Movement is also a vital factor in assessing the nature of New Mexico's progressivism. Because officeholders of the
Territory were appointed by the President, and territorial laws
were subject to congressional review, the political independence of
New Mexico was clearly limited. Governor Hagerman was more
answerable to President Theodore Roosevelt and his Secretary of
the Interior than to those he was supposedly serving, the people of
the Territory. During the constitutional convention of 1910, President William Howard Taft effectively intervened by urging New
Mexicans to adopt a "safe and sane constitution,"6 meaning one
without provisions for direct legislation. Although ex-President
Roosevelt vigorously agitated for a progressive instrument, conservatives dominated the constitutional convention and New Mexico presented to the Congress a very traditional state constitution,
except for its rigid safeguards of the political rights of Spanishspeaking citizens. Arizona's liberal constitution with its provisions
for initiative, referendum and recall, and even recall of judges,
stood in sharp contrast to New Mexico's.7
It was only natural that the ideas of the Progressive Movement
first appeared in New Mexico as a reac;tion to Republican dominance. Politicians of a progressive stripe were almost always opponents of "bossism," and they often devoted their campaigns to
an assault on the Republican Old Guard. Attention was also given to
the evils of corruption, albeit with more wariness because of its apparent acceptance by many New Mexicans. The purchase of votes
by small sums of money, usually used for liquor, was so open and
widespread that even the shrewd progressive leader, Bronson M.
Cutting, felt he could arouse no public outcry against it. s

WITHIN this setting of a frontier territory inhabited by so many
citizens of Spanish extraction, the careers of four leading Republican progressives will be examined. Miguel A. Otero, Herbert J.
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Hagennan, George Curry, and Bronson M. Cutting were among
the most prominent Republican reformers in New Mexico. There
were, of course, progressive leaders among the Democrats, Harvey
B. Fergusson, former Territorial Delegate and two-term congressman, being one of the purest, most ideologically committed progressives in the state's history. But the study undertaken here will
purposely limit itself to Roosevelt-type Republican progressives.
Otero was the first Republican politician to openly challenge
the power of the Old Guard. Appointed the first Hispano governor
of the territory in 1897, the proud, thirty-eight-year-old native of
San Miguel County led a generational struggle against the Republican leaders, being particularly determined to free himself from
Catron's dominating influence. In the course of his struggle against
the party establishment, Otero and his supporters soon acquired the
appropriate nickname "Colts." It must be noted, however, that a
good many of the prominent Colts became conservative party
leaders once Otero had established himself as the new Republican
leader. 9 Holm O. Bursum, a friend of Otero and the Republican
leader of Socorro County, eventually assumed Catron's role as the
spokesman for party conservatism in New Mexico. 10
As governor, Otero warred so vigorously against politicians he
considered corrupt and prone to bossism that even President Roosevelt, the national progressive leader, became alanned at the growth
of party disharmony in New Mexico. Otero's removal of Frank A.
Hubbell, wealthy sheep owner and assessor of Bernalillo County,
who was besieged by charges of favoring certain Albuquerque merchants in his assessments, triggered a major political crisis in the
Territory which compelled the pragmatic Roosevelt to force Otero's
resignation. l l Although the self-righteous Otero resented the President's action, he later supported him in his 19 I 2 Bull Moose campaign to regain the presidency. Otero and Curry signed the call for
the formation of a Progressive party in New Mexico/ 2 and Otero
was subsequently elected state chairman of the party.13 The
slightly-built native leader had hoped several months earlier to be
nominated as candidate for the new state's first governorship,14 but
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a new crop of conservatives now dominated the Republican party
and Bursum was nominated instead.
Otero was certainly far from being a radical in his thin-king. Indeed, he prided himself on the many good friends he had made in
big business during his governorship.15 But then Roosevelt progressivism had always attempted to maintain friendly contacts with
the business community. Otero's strength was, rather, an unusual
commitment to upright and efficient government for a politician
from frontier New Mexico. And, of course, it was Roosevelt's concern with the consequences of Otero's divisive actions and their
possible effect on the national party situation that caused the President to call a halt to Otero's determined political house cleaning.
In the Territory, however, the numerous detractors of the "little
Governor," as Otero was often called, could only see self-serving
political motives in his actions. "Oteroism" to them was bossism
in reverse, to borrow an overworl~ed term from the civil rights controversy of the 19 60 ' S.16
Herbert J. Hagerman, a well educated, white Anglo-Saxon Protestant, fits the mold of the progressive .leader outlined in George
E. Mowry's The California Progressives 17 more easily than does
Otero. Although his father, J. J. Hagerman, was an acquisitive
Western empire builder who was responsible for railroad building
and irrigation development in the Pecos Valley, young Hagerman's
interests were in public service, as is often the case with secondgeneration wealth. In 1906, Roosevelt appointed him governor of
the Territory and told him to clean house, an order which Hagerman had e,:ery intention of following religiously. In the process
of rooting out corruption the idealistic new governor removed Bursum as Superintendent of Prisons for an alleged mishandling of
funds. This move immediately threw the Republican party of New
Mexico into such disarray that Roosevelt, who had also hoped that
the young governor would restore political peace in the Territory,
saw no solution but to compel Hagerman's resignation on the basis
of mistakes made during his short tenure. IS By this time Hagerman
was so determined to vindicate himself, that he did not return to
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the diplomatic service where he had had previous governmental
experience, but remained in New Mexico to do battle with Bursum and the other Old Guard Republicans.
Hagerman's progressivism extended beyond th~e purely political
issues of reform. He and Santa Fe attorney Richard H. Hanna, a
progressive Republican who later ran unsuccessfully as a Democrat for the governorship and the United States Senate/ 9 both
opposed the 19 I 0 constitution with its weak provisions for corporate
regulation and difficult amending procedure. Hagerman and
Hanna joined progressive Democrats such as Fergusson in lobbying
in Congress against the conservative constitution. 20 When the
newly admitted state held its first elections, Hagerman and Hanna
fused with the Democrats, calling themselves "Progressive Republicans," and brought about the defeat of Holm Bursum in his bid
for the governorship.
The progressivism of Governor Hagerman appears to have had a
broader ideological base than did Otero's but like the "little Governor" he too was motivated by strong generational factors, being
only thirty-four years old at the time of his appointment as governor.
Moreover his ego was as big as Otero's, even if his aspirations for
political power were not quite as evident. After President Roosevelt
forced him to resign he had a book privately printed to present his
side of the case, particularly as it concerned his conduct in the land
fraud case involving the controversial Pennsylvania Development
Company.21
George Curry was older than Otero and Hagerman when he was
appointed territorial governor by Theodore Roosevelt in 19°7. The
forty-six-year-old former Rough Rider, a great pal of Roosevelt's,
never became anti-establishment and had lifelong friendships with
Bursum and Fall. Yet, largely because of his admiration for Roosevelt, Curry became a good progressive governor. Following a dispute
with Gifford Pinchot, Roosevelt's Chief Forester, he was converted
to the administration's conservation program and established a conservation record quite remarkable for a Western governor. 22 A
strong believer in direct democracy, Curry, nineteen months after
he left the governorship, had the courage to break with his friends,
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in 191 I, and support the controversial Blue Ballot amendment,
which would have liberalized the amending procedure for the new
state constitution, even though it very nearly cost him his nomination for the House of Representatives. When Roosevelt bolted the
Republican party inl 912, Curry, who was serving in the House
along with Fergusson, became the first member of Congress to come
out openly in favor of the ex-President.23
Governor Curry was a different breed of progressive than Otero,
Hagerman, and Cutting. Older, lacking in formal education, and
very much a product of the frontier, Curry was never too concerned
about corruption and bossism, because his friends allegedly were
the corrupted politicians and bosses themselves. He was like his
idol, President Roosevelt, in his pragmatic approach to politics, even
agitating in,the tradition of the tireless T. R. for military preparedness on the eve of World War J.24
Of the four Republican progressives being considered here Bronson Cutting emerges as the most interesting and complex. Born into
a wealthy, aristocratic New York family, the scholarly Cutting arrived in New Mexico in 1910 at the age of twenty-four. A tubercular, the idealistic and strong-willed New Yorker had to lead a
retiring life at first, but in 1912 he purchased the Santa Fe New
Mexican and quickly his editorial policies became an important
force in New Mexico politics. Liberal in his views, he was a quiet
member of the Progressive Republican League, but became publicly
identified with the reform cause when he was elected treasurer of
the state Progressive party in 1912 and later served as chairman
from 1 9 1 4 to I 9 1 6. 25
Cutting was an uncompromising foe of bossism and corruption
and conducted an almost uninterrupted crusade against the Old
Guard, even employing the William J. Burns Detective Agency
which secretively placed a dictaphone in Bursum's room to gather
information about Republican "gang activities."26 He refused to support Bursum and Frank Hubbell in their bids for the governorship
and the United States Senate, in 1916, and his refusal led to a
break with Roosevelt, despite the fact that Cutting had only recently
backed his friend for the presidential nomination of the national
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Progressive party. Earlier, when Roosevelt was campaigning in New
Mexico for Charles Evans Hughes, the Republican standard-bearer,
he had wanted party unity from the state on up, but Cutting would
only support the national ticket. 27 Cutting's. willingness to break
with his party with very little hesitation, the most distinct characteristic of his twenty-three-year political career, accomplished not
only the eventual undoing of the Republican Old Guard, but probably brought about, as much as anything else, the end of the party's
dominant role in New Mexico during the thirties. 28
Cutting is vulnerable to the charge that he thirsted for political
power; his party switching and his inability to work wth progressiveminded associates for any length of time seem to connote a strong
personal ambition. His refusal to support the election code of Governor Arthur J. Hannett, in 1926, even though it was in harmony
with the progressive emphasis on clean, honest electoral procedure,
is revealing, especially when one considers that his main support
was from Spanish-speaking people who opposed the code. 29 Never.:.
theless, this youthful political renegade remained liberal as he advanced into middle age, being among those progressive leaders who
supported the New Deal, a definite minority according to Otis L.
Graham's detailed study. 30
The political careers of the four leaders provide some intriguing
insights into the motivations of the New Mexico progressive. Three
of the four were relatively young men, but youth is traditionally
more willing- to accept new and progressive ideas. Even so several
of Governor Otero's Colts rather predictably went on to become
leaders of the party's Old Guard. Each of the four was a personally
motivated political animal; George Curry, the most pragmatic and
typically New Mexican in a political sense, was an almost perpetual
officeseeker. 31
Their ideological beliefs strongly centered around the political
aspects of progressivism. Corruption in government and bossism
dwarfed the other burning concerns associated with national progressivism. Otero, Hagerman, and Cutting broke with Roosevelt
over how to best cope with these two serious and, unfortunately,
all too typical New Mexican problems. The old political boss.es were
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me~ schooled in the tough post-Civil War generation of laissez-faire
economics and politics. Many of the younger men who came to New
Mexico around the turn of the century regarded as reprehensible
the loose ethics they saw in business and government, and the
shrewd manipulation of native New Mexicans for selfish political
goals. To strike hard at boss rule became the great passion of progressive politicians in New Mexico, leaving direct legislation and
conservation for secondary consideration. Business monopoly and
consumer and worker welfare, the really "gut issues" of the movement, which were so important to urban America, were given almost cursory attention in New Mexico.
It is possible that in attempting to reform government, the four
leaders examined, Cutting and Hagerman in particular, were exhibiting a keener political sense than the Catrons and Bursums of
New Mexico. Around the turn of the century the composition of
the Territory's population was changing. By 19°°, twenty per cent
of the inhabitants claimed birth in another state, this figure rising
to thirty-nine per cent in 1910.32 New Mexico was becoming increasingly Americanized, and shrewd politicians did not have to
exercise much imagination to see that a distinctly Anglo political
morality w~s rising proportionately. The isolation of a frontier society no longer protected the Territory from outside influences. New
ideas were continually coming into New Mexico along with new
citizens, a process only accelerated when statehood was achieved
in 1912.
The New Mexico progressive, thus, appears to have had strong
personal and political reasons for being a reformer. The happy combination, so characteristic of American politics, of a good cause
united with personal ambition in the hoary tradition of enlightened
self-interest seems to have worked well in boss-ridden New Mexico.
Although the Old Guard did cling tenaciously to its power, the progressive was able to use political reform to slowly, but forcefully,
intrude himself into positions where he could better the political
environment to at least a modest degree.
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16. Catron accused the "little Governor" of heading his own ring. See
Otero, p. 197. The term Oteroism was used to characterize the governor's
administration in a pamphlet entitled "Cogent Reasons for Statehood," which
was enclosed in a letter from Albert J. Beveridge to Miguel A. Otero, December 19, 1902, located in the Miguel A. Otero Papers, Special Collections
Division, University of New Mexico Library, Albuquerque. !
17. George E. Mowry, The California Progressives (Berkeley, 1952).
18. Larson, New Mexico's Quest for Statehood, p. 292.
19. Curry, pp. 288, 293; Holmes, pp. 158, 179.
20. Larson, New Mexico's Quest for Statehood, p. 292.
21. Copies of this especially interesting ,book, entitled A Statement in
Regard to Certain Matters Concerning the Governorship and Political
Affairs in New Mexico in 1906-1907 and printed privately in 19°8, are
found in the Herbert J. Hagerman Papers, State Records Center and Archives, Santa Fe; Special Collections Division, University of New Mexico
Library, Albuquerque; and Private Papers Given to the National Archives,
Social and Economic Branch, National Archives, Records Group 316, Washington, D.C.
22. A detailed analysis of Curry's conservation record is included in a
paper, "George Curry of New Mexico: Territorial Governor in a Changing
Era," delivered by the writer at the Conference on the History of the Territories held in Washington, D.C., November 3-4,1969.
23· Curry, pp. 257-59,269-7°.
24. Ibid., pp. 272-75. Interestingly enough, Curry told Roosevelt that
he was utterly disgusted with Bursum's nomination for the governorship in
191 I, even though he later became Bursum's private secretary, and his
autobiography is full of praise for him. Probably Curry made the unfavorable
remark about his friend in order to please Roosevelt, being well aware of the
former President's suspicions regarding Old Guard Republican politicians.
See Roosevelt to Cutting, June 14, 1912, as quoted in Morison, vol. 7, pp.
561 -62 .
25. Armstrong, pp. 9, I!.
26. Ibid., pp. 12-13, 17. Cutting had a very low opinion of the leaders of
the Republican Old Guard. In a December I I, 191 I, letter to James Roger
Addison found in the Bronson Cutting Papers, Division of Manuscripts,
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., Cutting called Catron the "most
unscrupulous man in the Southwest" and Fall the most dangerous one.

244

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW XLV: 3 1970

27. Cutting explained his position to Roosevelt in two telegrams, one
dated November 4, 1916, the other undated, both of which are quoted in
Armstrong, pp. 24-25.
28. Curry claims that Cutting "virtually controlled every New Mexico
election result from 1916 to his death in 1935." Curry, p. 272. One eminent
New Mexico historian has compared the years just prior to Cutting's death
in an air crash with the turbulent decade of the 1850's in New Mexico, because of the sharp divisiveness caused by Cutting's unpredictable political
maneuvers. Frank D. Reeve, History of New Mexico (New York, 1961),
vol. 2, p. 362.
29. Provisions of the <:ode, which called for personal re-registration
every six years and uniform ballot boxes, are listed and discussed in G. L.
Seligmann, Jr., ''The Political Career of Senator Bronson M. Cutting" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of History, University of Arizona, 1967),
PP·59-60 .
30. Otis L. Graham, Jr., An Encore for Reform: The Old Progressives
and the New Deal (New York, 1967). Unfortunately, of the 105 progressive
leaders selected by Graham for an analysis of their views on the New Deal,
none of the four New Mexico leaders studied in this paper, including the
very prominent Cutting, were examined. The omission provides yet another
example of the neglect of Western political themes by historians studying
national movements. Many New Mexico progressives deserted Cutting when
he became a supporter of. the much more fundamental reforms of the New
Deal. Otero, however, continued his support, probably because Cutting was
subsidizing him in the writing of his autobiography. See Seligmann, pp.
63-64.
31. Prior to being appointed governor, Curry's friend, Major William
H. H. Llewellyn, was seeking two minor government posts in New Mexico
for him, a rather familiar pattern in Curry's political career. See Robert W.
Larson, "Ballinger Vs. Rough Rider George Curry: The Other Feud," New
Mexico Historical Review, vol. 43 (1968), pp. 276, 288.
32. Holmes, p. 9.

